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Abstract 
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introduction, of potential inflationary pressures by increasing their fares more in routes to 
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2004. To control for other factors that may affect fares’ setting decisions, we provide insights 
into the effects of the takeovers of Go Fly and Buzz by EasyJet and Ryan Air, respectively. 
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1. Introduction 
 “[…] the European Commission has announced it will investigate allegations that 
Apple is unfairly charging up to 20 per cent more for music downloads in the UK than it does in 
the rest of Europe. Apple charges UK users about 83p a track compared with about 52p in 
France and Germany. Apple says its pricing was based on "the underlying economic model in 
each country”. 
Financial Times,  4th March 2005 
As Motta (2003) posits: “price discrimination is a pervasive phenomenon, of which 
examples from our daily life abound” (p.491). A recent example is given by the differential 
pricing made by Apple in the electronic music market. Similarly, a visit to the web site of Tele2, 
the international telecommunication company, will reveal that it charges 12.5 eurocent per 
minute (plus a fixed charge of 15.5 eurocent at the conversation start) for calls from Italy to UK, 
while residents in UK pay their calls to Italy only 2.5 pence per minute (and no fixed charge at 
the start).1 At the current exchange rate of 0.7 £/euro, this corresponds to a situation where the 
Italian residents are charged about four times more. 
A company’s ability to charge different prices for the same product in different 
countries is an instance of “third degree price discrimination” (Motta, 2003). Two recent 
developments have brought back the issue of price discrimination to the forefront of economic 
analysis. Firstly, the Internet was considered a technological advancement capable of bringing 
about a business environment replicating the characteristics of a perfectly competitive market 
i.e. low search costs, low barriers to entry and easy price comparability. However, doubts were 
immediately cast on the likelihood that the Internet would engender “frictionless markets” 
(Ellison and Ellison, 2005).  
Secondly, on the 1st of January 2002, twelve European countries adopted a common 
currency, the Euro. It was expected that its introduction could enhance transparency of prices, 
facilitate comparisons across countries and, ultimately, competition. Contrary to these 
predictions, anecdotal evidence reported on the press seems to suggest a huge rise in the price 
level after the Euro changeover. This was particularly severe in sectors protected by 
international competition. More formally, Baye et al (2005) compare on-line electronic goods 
before and after the changeover, and find that average and minimum prices increased, 
respectively, by 3% and 7%. In the case of the European car market, Goldberg and Verboven 
                                                     
1 Information retrieved from the site www.tele2.it on March, 14th 2006. and from 
www.tele2.co.uk before Tele2’s UK operations were sold to another company in January 2006.  
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(2004) concluded that price differentials in Eurozone countries decreased after the Euro 
introduction, but that cross-country price differences remained large, even among members. 
They argue that the remaining high price differentials after the euro call for structural 
interventions.  
Interestingly, a structural approach such as the liberalisation of the European Civil 
Aviation industry was fully completed in 1997. Since then, a frantic entry and exit activity has 
taken place, leading to the establishment of many new carriers adopting the “low-cost” business 
concept pioneered in the U.S. by the Southwest Airline (Boguslaski et al., 2004, Gil-Molto and 
Piga, 2005). 
It is against this backdrop that we aim to study the determinants of annual price changes 
in the airline industry over the period June 2002- June 2005. To do so, we rely on primary data 
obtained by retrieving the fares posted on-line for flights within UK, and from UK to other 
European countries. The annual price changes are worked out to remove seasonality, for the 
same company operating on a given route. After controlling for variations in cost, inflation, 
exchange rate and market structure, we attempt to shed light on three issues. 
First, we focus on whether the airlines systematically increased their fares more to take 
advantage of the turmoil following the Euro adoption, especially in the second half of 2003 and 
in the first part of 2004. Thus, given our period of analysis, we do not compare fares pre- and 
post-changeover but we provide some evidence of its consequences. The comparison of each 
country with the base case of UK reveals that fares evolved very similarly for flights to both UK 
domestic and each of main Eurozone countries’ destinations. However, Eurozone countries as a 
whole, compared to those outside Eurozone, recorded higher increases in the period Apr 2004-
Mar 2005 (relative to the previous corresponding 12 months). Such a difference was short-lived, 
as no significant difference is found in the subsequent period, and is generally restricted to 
certain fare categories. 
Second, our analysis reveals important insights into the effects of the takeovers of Go 
Fly and Buzz by EasyJet and Ryan Air, respectively, which occurred in the period under study. 
Generally, it was found that the acquiring firms reduced their fares relative to the levels charged 
12 months earlier by the target firms. Thus, in the months following the takeover Easyjet 
reduced its fares by about 16%, while Ryan Air by 7%. However, an important distinction needs 
to be emphasized. The findings indicate that the Easyjet reductions were found across all fares 
available from 70 days up to 1 day prior to departure. In contrast, Ryan Air offered higher 
average late booking fares (those for purchases made less than 7 days before departure) while it 
also cut its early booking ones. These findings indicate that in the aviation industry, the 
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evaluation of a merger in terms of its benefit for consumers should take into account the variety 
of fares that airlines offer. 
Third, we estimate the magnitude of the promotional fares offered by low cost carriers 
(henceforth, LCC) when they enter a new route. When the analysis is disaggregated between 
early booking and late booking fares, the estimates reveal an increase in fares of about 11% 
twelve months after a new service is launched. These differences become negligible when fares 
across different booking periods are averaged out, suggesting how post-entry promotional 
pricing tends to be associated mostly with certain categories of fares, presumably those for early 
bookings.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section illustrates how the fares were 
collected, and the nature of the secondary data used to describe the traffic on a route. Section 3 
provides some descriptive statistics derived from the original price dataset, plus information on 
the estimation strategy. Section 4 outlines the econometric models, whose results are 
commented in the Section 5. Some conclusive remarks are included in Section 6. 
2. Data Collection 
Most of the empirical contributions on pricing behaviour in the Civil Aviation industry 
have focused, so far, mainly on the U.S. market, whereas few studies have been devoted to the 
European market. Moreover, the analysis of the U.S. aviation sector has been mostly conducted 
relying on different cohorts of the same dataset, namely the Databank of the U.S.A. Department 
of Transportation’s Origin and Destination Survey, which is a 10 percent yearly random sample 
of all tickets that originate in the United States on U.S. carriers (Evans and Kessides, 1993; 
Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Hayes and Ross, 1998; Alam et al., 2001; Stavins, 2001; Liu, 
2003). In this dataset prices are measured as one-way fares and are computed as one-half of the 
reported fare round-trip tickets. All tickets other than one-way and round trips are excluded.  
In contrast, our analysis is based on primary data on fares and secondary data on routes 
traffic. Initially, when the project began in May 2002, fares were collected using an “ electronic 
spider”, which connected directly to the websites of only the main LCC (i.e., Ryanair, Buzz, 
Easyjet, GoFly) operating in Britain at the time. Collection of fares for flights operated by Full 
Service Carriers (i.e., British Airways, Air Lingus, Air France, Lufthansa, KLM, Alitalia, Iberia, 
SAS, Tap Portugal, Air Europa and Maersk) started in March 2003: in this case, fares were 
collected only for flights that Full Service Carriers (henceforth, FSC) operated on routes similar 
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or identical to those where a LCC also flew.2 This decision was necessary to reduce the number 
of routes under study, where each route is identified in this study as an airport pair combination.  
The dataset includes daily flights information operated from June 2002 up to, and 
including, June 2005, for a total of 37 months. Over the period of analysis, a number of 
important events took place which are somehow reflected in the dataset. First, a series of 
takeovers occurred: Easyjet acquired GoFly (December 2002) and Ryan Air took over Buzz 
(March 2003). Second, new LCC began their operations: the “spider” was upgraded to retrieve 
fares from the Bmibaby and MyTravelLite sites. However, due to technical difficulties, fares 
from Flybe, which was already an established LCC, and Thomson Fly, a new entrant could not 
be obtained. This is not important, as far as sample selection issues are concerned, as traffic 
operated by every airline is used to construct market indicators.  
Over the 37 months period, fares from UK for flights to and from the following Euro-
adopting countries were obtained: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. A term of comparison is provided by fares for flights to the 
following countries outside the Euro area: Czech Republic, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland as 
well as UK, whose domestic routes were also considered. 
In order to account for the variety of fares offered by airlines at different times prior to 
departure, every day we collected the fares for departures due, respectively, 1, 4, 7, 10, 14, 21, 
28, 35, 42, 49, 56, 63 and 70 days from the date of the query. Henceforth, these will be referred 
to as “booking days”. So, for instance, if we consider London Stansted-Rome Ciampino as the 
route of interest, and assume the query for the flights operated by a given airline was carried out 
on March 1st 2004, the spider would retrieve the prices for both the London Stansted-Rome 
Ciampino and the Rome Ciampino-London Stansted routes for departures on 2/3/04, 5/3/04, 
8/3/04, 11/3/04 and so on. The return flight for both types of journeys was scheduled one week 
after the departure. For those routes where an airline operates more than one flight per day, all 
fares for every flight were collected. Thus, for every daily flight we managed to obtain up to 13 
prices that differ by the time interval from the day of departure. The main reason to do so was to 
satisfy the need to identify the evolution of fares - from more than two months prior to departure 
to the day before departure – which has been noted to be very variable for the case of LCC (Pels 
and Rietveld, 2004; Giaume and Guillou, 2004). While the spider could have retrieved any 
                                                     
2 The airfares of the traditional companies were collected from the website www.opodo.co.uk, 
which is owned and managed by British Airways, Air France, Alitalia, Iberia, KLM, Lufthansa, Aer 
Lingus, Austrian Airlines, Finnair and the global distribution system Amadeus. Thus, fares listed on 
Opodo are the official prices of each airline, although Opodo may not report promotional offers that each 
airline may offer on their web sites. 
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number of prices, in practice the need to reduce both the number of queries made to an airline 
server and the time of programme execution to a manageable level, led to the design above. 
Furthermore, given the site characteristics of Opodo, it was impossible to collect Full Service 
Carriers’ fares 1 and 4 days prior to departure: it was also decided to omit collecting fares from 
these companies for flights due to depart more than 49 days after the query. Thus, for Full 
Service Carriers, up to 8 fares per daily flight are available.  
The collection of the airfares has been carried out everyday at the same time: in addition 
to airfares we collected the name of the company, the time and date of the query, the departure 
date, the scheduled departure and arrival time, the origin and destination airports and the flight 
identification code.  
Fares were collected before tax and handling fees for the case of LCC, but inclusive of 
them for the Full Service Carriers (henceforth FSC). This is not a problem for two reasons. 
First, as discussed below, the analysis focuses on the changes made by each airline on the fares 
posted in the same months of two consecutive years. Thus, differencing would generally cancel 
out the taxes included in the FSC’ fares. Second, while airport taxes were increased over the 
three years period we consider, these changes were of negligible magnitude (2-5%) and 
occurred in the great majority of destinations. Furthermore, fares for LCC were one-way, while 
those for FSC were for a round trip and were therefore halved.  
To complement the price data with market structure characteristics, secondary data on 
the traffic for all the routes and all the airlines flying to the countries indicated above was 
obtained from the UK Civil Aviation Authority (henceforth, CAA).3 For each combination of 
company, route and departure period (i.e., month/year), the CAA provided the number of 
monthly seats, the number of monthly passengers and the monthly load factors. These were 
broken down at the flight identification code level, that is, for each flight each airline operated 
in a given month on a route. However, in order to create a more balanced panel, fares and traffic 
statistics were aggregated at the route level for each airline, thereby not exploiting the detailed 
information available at the flight code level. 
Figure 1 provides a summary of the evolution of total flights and passengers’ traffic 
from the UK to the universe of destinations in the Euro and no Euro areas (the latter including 
UK domestic flights). Some striking aspects emerge. First, the six main LCC considered in this 
study operate about a third of flights to both areas: evidence not reported suggests that Ryan Air 
and EasyJet manage a large share of these flights, especially after the two takeovers. A similar 
                                                     
3 See www.caa.co.uk 
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comment can be made with regards to passengers’ traffic. Second, LCC seem to benefit from 
higher load factors, as their Total Passengers curve remains above that of Total Flights.4 In 
contrast, the FSC’ Total Passengers curve is always well below the corresponding Total Flights’ 
one. Finally, traffic to Eurozone destinations tends to be influenced more by seasonal 
fluctuations. 
3. Estimation strategy and Datasets Analysis 
Two reduced-form models are estimated. The first is formally represented as follows: 
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where P is the mean price for each ijb group over a month, i=company; j=route (and 
therefore country of arrival); b=booking days to departure; t=month. Regressors may be time 
variant (the Xs) and invariant (the Zs), while the errors are given by the sum of an unobserved 
effect (the δ) and an idiosyncratic component (the ε). For each month, average fares for an 
airline on a given route were calculated by using all the fares’ observations in each “booking 
days” group. Then, to obtain the dependent variable, we computed the percentage change of 
these average fares in the same months of two consecutive years. Such a strategy enables us to 
compare “likes” with “likes” to deal with the presence of seasonal fluctuations and to identify 
whether airlines tended to increase their fares differentially across “booking days”.  
The second approach aggregates over “booking days” and therefore considers the 
change of an average price, which is the result of the different fares available at different points 
in time. That is: 
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Comparisons between the estimates from (1) and (2) are assumed to yield interesting 
insights into the impact of the variety of fares offered by airlines. The following analysis of 
some of the datasets’ features is relevant for both models. 
Table 1 reports average one-way fares by the airlines in different seasons 
(corresponding to the Summer – April to October- and the Winter - November to March - 
timetables). Note how more than 10 millions daily fares were used to calculate the monthly 
averages for each group. About 70% of these observations pertain to flights operated by EasyJet 
and Ryan Air. The two main British FSC are also highly represented: British Airways with 
                                                     
4 The number of total passengers was divided by 100, so that the same scale could be used to 
represent both types of curves. 
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about 1 million observation and BMI British Midland with almost half a million, to which one 
should add the observations of its low-cost subsidiary, BmiBaby. In any case, routes offered by 
the FSC were selected only for those markets (identified by city pairs, e.g., London to Rome) 
where at least one LCC was operating. Thus, Table 1 offers a straightforward way to compare 
fares by competing companies in differentiated markets. Generally, even accounting for the 
obvious difference due to the inclusion of airport taxes in the FSC’ fares, the latter seem to be 
higher throughout the period.  
Table 2 shows yearly changes for the mean, median and minimum price in each month, 
broken down by area of destination and “booking days”. A first point is the greater fluctuation 
of the minimum fares, suggesting that these may be often used to gauge demand. Another 
noteworthy distinction regards how late booking fares (1 to 4 days to departure) have generally 
increased throughout the period, while the largest variations are shown for fares retrieved 35 up 
to 14 days prior to departure. This may be indicative of a more intense competition triggered by 
the airlines’ interest to maximise load factors. Relatedly, fares remained relatively stable when 
they were posted 10 up to 7 days to departure. Table 2 does not show any indication of larger 
increases in Eurozone. A further analysis of the evolution of fare changes by country and type 
of carrier is provided in Figure A1 and A2 in Appendix A. 
Table 3 reports statistics on the number of routes that are served, respectively, by one, 
two and three or more companies, where the number of airlines is worked out using the CAA 
data. Three different samples are used. The universe of routes is indicated in the CAA column: 
throughout the period, about 77% of total routes are monopoly, 18% or more are duopolies and 
about 5% or less have three or more players. This is a clear indication of an industry in which 
companies try to avoid direct competition by exploiting the possibility to serve a city pair (say 
London-Rome) by using different routes that are part of that city pair (e.g., Heathrow-Rome 
Fiumicino and London Stansted-Rome Ciampino).  
In Table 3, the Internet columns outline the number of routes for which we have fares 
information in our Internet-retrieved dataset. It clearly shows that overall we have retrieved 
fares for about one third of the universe of routes (up to 283 in June 2005 from a universe of 
774). These differences are most likely due to the way routes for FSC were chosen, given that 
we left out routes where FSC do not face direct or indirect competition by LCC. Relative to the 
universe, monopoly routes tend to be marginally under-represented, while duopolistic routes in 
particular are over-represented. This is also a reflection of the way the FSC’ routes were 
selected.  
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In Table 3, the Estimation columns differ from the Internet price ones for two reasons. 
First, to calculate the monthly mean we considered only groups (i.e., a combination of airline-
route-booking day) where we had at least 11 observations per group per month. This is to avoid 
a spurious measure of the monthly average obtained from a very limited number of days or 
flights. Second, a route may have been added at later stage and so it was not possible to work 
out the twelve months’ lag difference. Nonetheless, the percentages in the Estimation columns 
do not differ drastically from those obtained from the CAA data. Furthermore, the estimation 
sample was intended to mostly represent routes where LCC operate, as well as routes and 
markets where LCC and FSC compete with each other. This is why the Estimation sample 
generally represents about 40.0% of the universe of duopoly routes and 50% or more of the 
universe of routes with 3 or more players. 
4. The empirical model 
In this section, we first describe the variables used to estimate equations (1) and (2). In 
the following discussion we distinguish the time-variant regressors as being route, company and 
company-route specific.  
Route-specific regressors. 
Potential country-level determinants of the annual change in the airline prices are 
represented by the inflation and the exchange rate of the euro and the other European currencies 
with respect to the British pound. The variable “Inflation Rate” is expected to exert a positive 
influence on the annual fare changes, as it represents a broad measure of the price dynamics 
within each country. It is also interacted with the “Eurozone” dummy, which is equal to one for 
every Euro adopting countries.  
Table 4 shows a differing behaviour for the Sterling exchange rate: it depreciated in the 
first two periods while remaining generally stable afterwards. Thus, we interact the exchange 
rate yearly variation in each country with the seasonal dummies to obtain two variables: “% Δ 
Exchng rate Seas3/4” and “% Δ Exchng rate Seas5/6/7”. The economic rationale for their 
inclusion is two-fold. Firstly, an appreciation of the European currencies with respect to the 
sterling pound may imply higher costs for goods and services denominated in European 
currencies. Secondly, there exists a more compelling, demand-side hypothesis. An appreciation 
of the continental Europe currencies should make travelling to UK cheaper for continental 
Europe’s residents, and more expensive for British travellers. Thus, a fare increase is simply 
likely not to influence the former’s decision to travel, as the holiday costs are reduced thanks to 
the currency’s appreciation. Given this situation, it would be sensible for airlines to increase 
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fares following a continental Europe’s currency appreciation. On the other hand, such an 
attempt to extract more surplus from continental Europeans may reduce the traffic of British 
travellers. These opponent forces should therefore neutralize the expected effect of variations in 
the exchange rate, if we assume that price elasticities are identical between these two groups of 
travellers. However, since the majority of route served by LCC can be considered, to a great 
extent, tourist destinations and given the documented short run inelasticity of the British tourist 
demand towards European countries (Li et al. 2003), we expect a negative coefficient and, 
therefore, a positive contributions in terms of the annual change in the posted airfares.  
Over the last three seasons in Table 4, jet-fuel prices have increased at a rate well above 
35%, relative to the same months a year earlier. This has certainly had strong repercussions on 
the fare settings. To this purpose, we have collected the Rotterdam (ARA) Kerosene-Type Jet 
Fuel Spot Price from the U.S. Department of Energy’s web site.5 However, the consumption of 
fuel varies with the different phases of the flight: when the aircraft flies at cruising speed fuel 
consumption is much lower than when the airplane takes off or lands. Thus, in order to capture 
these economies of scale we include the route distance in miles 
“City-pair Size”, obtained as the share of total flights in a city pair over the total flights 
to a country, provides an index of a market size and its potential demand. The “Route HHI” is 
the HHI index obtained by summing the squares of the market shares of the airlines in a route, 
where market shares are obtained in terms of number of flights each airline offers in a month. 
Both these variables identify a market structure characteristic and are therefore potentially 
endogenous with the decision to set fares. However, the number of flights an airline offers is 
decided a season in advance, when timetables are prepared. Fares are set in a more flexible way 
and can be adapted to reflect intervening circumstances. Thus the number of flights is likely to 
influence fares, but not be influenced by them. In other words, it is unlikely that both “City-pair 
Size” and “Route HHI” are correlated with the idiosyncratic errors εt. It is on the other hand 
possible that they are correlated with the unobserved effect δij: e.g., where airlines can charge 
higher fares they will also increase their capacity. Such considerations have important 
implications for our econometric approach. 
Company specific regressors. To capture the consequences on fares changes due to the 
takeovers discussed in the Introduction, the difference in the LHS of equations (1) and (2) is 
taken between the mean monthly fare charged by the target firm (Go Fly or Buzz) at month t 
                                                     
5 Because these were reported in USD cents per gallon, before calculating the annual changes, 
the prices were converted using the euro/dollar exchange rate from Datastream. 
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and the mean monthly fare charged by the acquiring firm (EasyJet or Ryan Air) at (t+12). The 
dummies “D_Buzz 1 yr post takeover” and “D_Gofly 1 yr post takeover” identify such 
observations. The estimated signs indicate whether the acquiring firms charged more or less 
relative to the target firms and therefore provide an indication as to whether the takeovers were 
welfare improving or reducing, at least in the aftermath of the takeovers. However, to control 
for long term effects, the observations for the price changes in the second year after the 
takeovers were also identified by two dummies: “D_Buzz 2 yrs post takeover” and “D_Gofly 2 
yrs post takeover”. 
Company-route specific regressors. The number of UK departure airports that an 
airline uses to serve a given destination (variable “N departures airline to arrival”), and the 
number of routes an airline serves within a city pair (variable “N routes airline in citypair”) are 
aimed at assessing if an airline’s network influences its fares’ setting.  
The dummy “D_Own Entry in route” indicates the twelfth month (and the subsequent 
two) after an airline enters a new route. Thus we try to capture the magnitude of the promotional 
fares an airline offers when launching a new service, by ascertaining whether and by how much 
fares have increased a year after entry. The dates of entry were obtained from the CAA dataset 
using the first period an airline is recorded on a route. A similar approach was followed in Gil 
Molto and Piga (2005) for the study of entry and exit in European routes and Berry (1992) for 
the case of entries in U.S. routes. 
Finally, we identify the two most important UK airports for each airline . To obtain this, 
we consider the total number of flights each airline operates from every UK airport. A dummy 
was used to identify the two most important (variable “D_Departure is a hub”). Note that such 
a variable is time invariant, at least in our dataset where the airlines exhibit a tendency to 
occupy a dominant position in certain airports.6 Again, a potential endogeneity with respect to 
the unobserved effect is assumed.  
Dummy regressors. In order to control for seasonal fluctuations, we introduced the five 
dummy variables Jun03-Oct03, Nov03-Mar04, Apr.04-Oct04, Nov04-Mar05 and Apr05-Jun05, 
where the first constitutes the base period. These are also interacted with the dummy 
“Eurozone” to capture common trends among the countries in the common currency area.  
                                                     
6 E.g., London Stansted and Glasgow Prestwick are the two most used UK airports by Ryan Air, 
Stansted and London Luton by EasyJet. Generally, the hubs thus defined correspond to the expectation an 
industry expert might have. For British Airways, the two hubs are, not surprisingly, Heathrow and 
Gatwick. 
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Country dummies were also included to assess potential systematic differences among 
countries that may complement the fact of being or not being member of the Euro area. These 
are of paramount relevance in the evaluation of the impact of the Euro introduction, as structural 
characteristics of an individual member country’s economy may have exacerbated or facilitated 
the post-changeover transition.  
“Booking days” effects were taken into account by allowing the following values for b  
in the ijb groups in equation (1): 1-4; 7-10; 14-21; 28-35; 42-49;56-70. These numbers represent 
the number of days prior to departure the fares were retrieved. For each of these values a 
dummy variable was constructed, the first being the base case. Furthermore, a dummy for each 
airline is included. 
Table 4 reports a list of some of the time variant regressors described above, as well as 
the data sources. Across periods, the inflation rates were marginally lower in the Euro area 
relative to the average of the countries in the sample. The average number of departure airports 
used by an airline to serve a destination has increased from 2.8 in the first period to 4.6 in the 
last, thereby suggesting a tendency to reduce bureaucratic costs at the destination level by 
exploiting economies of scale (Berry, 1992). In contrast, the number of routes an airline serves 
within a city pair tended to remain stable. The airlines in our sample entered new routes mostly 
during the period November 03 – March 05. As one would expect in a liberalised industry, the 
mean value of the HHI in our sampled routes declined throughout the periods. Finally, about 
two-thirds of the observations pertain to flights departing from a UK airport deemed as a hub. 
4. The estimation methods 
In equations (1) and (2), many explanatory variables are time invariant. Unfortunately, 
in a fixed-effects model, these variables are not identified. Using a random-effects model is not 
appropriate in our case, where some of the regressors are potentially correlated with the 
unobserved effects. To obtain coefficients for the time-invariant explanatory variables in (1) and 
(2), we rely on two methods.  
First, Hausman and Taylor (1981) propose an Instrumental Variable (IV), random 
effects (RE) estimator in which some of the explanatory variables are correlated with the 
unobserved effects, but not with the idiosyncratic error.  
The second method is a two-stage FE estimation procedure for the consistent estimation 
of the coefficients on the time invariant regressors, developed in Polachek and Kim (1994) and 
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further studied in Oaxaca and Geisler (2003).7 Recently, Bilotkach (2006) has applied it in a 
study of price dispersion in the U.S. airline market.  
The two-stage FE estimation procedure operates in the following manner: 
• Estimate each of our models by FE to obtain the βkFE, k=1..3. 
• Use these to estimate a heteroskedastic-robust OLS 
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where  and  are the group means of the time variant dependent and 
explanatory variables. Note how, given the potential endogeneity of some of the Zs, the second 
stage has to employ an IV procedure. 
)ln(12 •Δ ijbP •KX
Initially the first stage was also estimated using an IV approach, assuming that the 
“Route HHI” could be endogenously correlated with the idiosyncratic error. A Hausman’s test 
rejected such hypothesis. The first stage FE estimates are obtained using heteroskedastic and 
panel autocorrelation-consistent variance estimates.  
5.Results 
The results from the estimation of equations (1) and (2) are reported in Tables 5 and 6, 
respectively. To account for possible biases induced by the different methods used to collect the 
data for FSC, the Tables include both estimates from the full sample (FSC + LCC) and the LCC 
sample only. Generally, similar implications could be drawn, so the following discussion is 
based on the full sample’s results.  
First, note how the time-varying coefficients from the IV RE procedure tend to be 
similar to those obtained using the two-stage FE approach, thus suggesting the correlation of 
“Citypair Size”, “route HHI” and “D_Departure is a Hub” with the unobserved effect.8 As far 
as the time-invariant regressors are concerned, the two methods estimate coefficients that have 
similar magnitudes, signs and level of significance. Thus, the two methods lead to equivalent 
conclusions, which will be discussed by focussing on the possible differential effects in Euro-
                                                     
7 Oaxaca and Geisler (2003) demonstrate the equivalence between the two-stage FE GLS 
estimates and the OLS coefficient estimates from a pooled cross-section, time –series model. However, 
because the estimated standard errors differ, they derive a test to discriminate between the two methods. 
However, given the potential endogeneity of some explanatory variables with the unobserved effects, we 
will employ only the two-stage FE estimator. 
8 It is not possible to produce a formal Hausman test given the differences in which the standard 
errors are computed in the two methods, Similarly, no AIC can be obtained after the coefficients’ 
computations, which led to the choice of showing the results from both methods.  
 13
adopting countries, the post-takeovers pricing behaviour of the acquiring firms, and the post-
entry pricing behaviour of an entrant. A brief comment on the remaining control variables is 
made at the end of this section. 
5.1. Did fares grow more in the Eurozone? 
Relative to the base-period, the seasonal dummies reveal a growing trend for fares: in 
Table 5, Eurozone fares in seasons 5 and 6 increased more than average by 5-7%. Such an effect 
maintains its magnitude but loses its significance in Table 6, suggesting that the higher increases 
in Table 5 may be due to variability induced by the airlines’ yield management techniques and 
have little to do with international price discrimination. Relative to the UK base-case, in Table 5 
the countries’ dummies are generally insignificant or negative, with the exception of Spain and 
France in the LCC sample. These effects disappear in Table 6, where the dummies for Eurozone 
countries become largely insignificant in most cases, or negative. This is again consistent with 
an attempt by airlines to use differential fares across booking periods to maximise revenues and 
manage volatile levels of demand, and lends little support to the hypothesis of systematic price 
discrimination across countries.  
Recall how the exchange rate is assumed to affect the cost for airlines of goods and 
services denominated in currencies other than the sterling as well as a traveller’s total cost of a 
trip. In periods 3 and 4, a 1% appreciation of the Euro relative to the sterling is associated with 
an increase of about 0.7% in fares. In subsequent periods, when the sterling remained more 
stable, no significant correlation is found in Table 5, although Table 6 indicates that an 
appreciation of the sterling by 1% was accompanied by an increase of about 0.5%. Thus, in line 
with Goldberg and Verboven (2004), we find that differences in prices may be induced by 
differences in the monetary policies inside and outside the Eurozone.  
Further support in this sense is provided by the coefficients of the inflation rate in Table 
5: while outside the Eurozone the elasticity of fares with respect to inflation is about 4.6, in 
Eurozone the changes in inflation rates are negatively associated with fare changes. However, 
such a difference seems to be driven by specific yield management techniques whose effects 
cancel out when the fares across different booking periods are averaged out. Indeed, the net 
impact of the inflation rate changes in Table 6 is very close to zero for the Eurozone members.  
5.2 Price changes resulting from the takeovers. 
Table 5 shows how, in the twelve month following the takeovers, EasyJet reduced its 
fares by 16% on the same routes where Gofly was operative, while Ryan Air charged on 
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average 7% less than Buzz. However, two important distinctions can be inferred regarding the 
pricing behaviour of the acquiring firms. First, the above reductions by Ryan Air in the first year 
disappear in Table 6, while they are confirmed in the Gofly case. To further investigate this 
finding, Figure 3 reports the percentage change of pre-takeover fares relative to the post-
takeover ones, broken down by booking period. It is evident that EasyJet reduced its fares 
across all booking periods. On the contrary, Ryan Air only reduced its early booking fares but 
sharply increased late booking fares. Thus, in the short term, whether the Ryan Air/Buzz 
takeover has produced beneficial effects depends crucially on the proportion of early booking 
passengers (e.g., those travelling on tourism or to visit friends and relatives) relative to late 
booking customers (i.e., people travelling on business). Although we do not have data on sales 
made at different times prior to departure, it is unlikely that a large proportion of seats are sold 
only a few days prior to departure, especially considering the large price hikes imposed by 
airlines in these circumstances.  
However, further doubts on the benefits of the Ryan Air takeover are shown in the two 
Tables 5 and 6. Indeed, Ryan Air, in its second year of operation on the routes previously 
serviced by Buzz, pushed its fares up by about 10%: this time, no difference arises in the two 
Tables, indicating that the increases were consistent across the booking periods. In shark 
contrast, EasyJet did not raise its fares relative to the level it charged immediately after the 
takeover. Bearing in mind that this analysis does not consider possible cost-saving effects for 
the acquiring firm, and given the low fares reported in Table 1, it is unlikely that the Buzz 
takeover could be deemed welfare reducing. Our results, however, reveal how in the aviation 
industry, the evaluation of a merger in terms of its benefits for consumers should take into 
account the variety of fares that airlines offer. 
5.3 Promotional fares and other control variables 
The coefficient for “D_Own Entry in a route” in Table 5 reveals how the entrants 
charged on average 11% more twelve months after the entry in a new route. This could be 
explained by promotional pricing aimed at making the new service known to potentially 
interested travellers. When early booking fares are averaged with late booking ones, as in Table 
6, post-entry fares appear to be only marginally positive and significant. Thus, promotional 
pricing seems to be available only for certain categories of fares, presumably those for early 
booking.  
Elasticity of fare changes relative to fuel cost is about 0.39: as expected, fares reflect 
cost variations, although this may have differential impact across airlines, as some of them may 
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have signed up from long-term contract with fuel suppliers and may be therefore less affected 
by the steep upward trend of oil price. The negative sign of the “Distance” variable reflects 
possible economies of scale arising from the fixed costs due to landing and take-off.  
On average, fares in routes departing from an airline’s hub increased 13% less than in 
routes where the departure airport is not a hub. This seems in contrast with previous studies 
revealing a “hub premium” arising from the exploitation of the strategic advantages that hubs 
conferred to U.S. airlines (Borenstein, 1989). However, the negative coefficient suggests how 
the principal reason why most European LCC arrange as many flights as possible from a limited 
number of departure airports is to save on overhead costs (Berry, 1992).  
Finally, the measures for market size and route concentration point out to larger fare 
rises in denser markets and in more concentrated routes. There are consistent across the two 
Tables.  
6. Conclusions  
Our empirical analysis shows that third-degree price discrimination has not exerted any 
strong impact on the annual changes of the on-line airfares within the European civil aviation 
market. That is, we find little evidence that airlines set their fares by systematically using "the 
underlying economic model in each country”, as in the case of Apple. Indeed, difference among 
countries seem to be driven mainly by the contingent state of demand in relation to the number 
of days that separate the date in which a fare is posted from the date a flight departs. However, 
as discussed in Goldberg and Verboven (2004), monetary policy in Eurozone, by affecting the 
dynamics of exchange rates and inflation, seems to have repercussions on airlines’ pricing.  
Our findings indicate uncontroversial positive welfare-effects for the EasyJet/Go Fly 
takeover and reveal interesting insights on the practice of fares’ setting by Ryan Air, at least as 
far as the routes it took over from Buzz are concerned. Indeed, relative to Buzz, Ryan Air raised 
its late booking fares, but reduced the fares available 21 days or earlier prior to departure. This 
is perfectly consistent with the standard textbook treatment of third-degree price discrimination 
where consumers with less elastic demands are charged more. More generally, the evidence 
indicates how the evaluation of mergers in the aviation market should take into account the 
array of fares offered by airlines at different points in time.  
Similarly, promotional pricing is more likely to be offered only for certain categories of 
fares: this has obvious implications on how to assess the impact of a new entrant (Joskow et al., 
1994).  
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Appendix A. 
Figure A1: Average Monthly Price % change in Eurozone countries by type of carrier.  
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Figure A2: Average Monthly Price % change in non-Eurozone countries by type of carrier. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of total flights and passengers by geographical location and type of carrier. 
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TABLE 1 - Average one-way fares by airline and season 
 Jun02-Oct02 Nov02-Mar03 Apr03-Oct03 Nov03-Mar04 Apr04-Oct04 Nov04-Mar05 Apr05-Jun05 Tot.Obs. 
Bmibaby  46.0 (21963) 48.9 (115201) 29.8 (61486) 38.3 (160972) 31.2 (129706) 40.7 (55685) 545013 
RYANAIR 44.9 (133127) 30.3 (304771) 35.7 (715953) 25.5 (407605) 34.9 (784571) 23.9 (470781) 31.2 (500256) 3317064 
EASYJET 47.9 (104427) 38.3 (316854) 47.7 (685381) 33.7 (457398) 42.7 (1022782) 37.3 (504738) 48.4 (590450) 3682030 
BUZZ 59.0 (43198) 33.7 (67724)      110922 
Go Fly 73.9 (74288) 44.6 (50988)      125276 
MyTravelLite    41.8 (12103) 59.1 (37382) 36.1 (30667) 57.2 (19708) 99860 
Aer Lingus   56.5 (31008) 53.2 (15437) 59.1 (26765) 99.5 (56791) 103.4 (17336) 147337 
Air Europa   51.7 (2147) 54.1 (811) 96.6 (1947) 94.1 (16356) 86.5 (4867) 26128 
Air France   41.4 (11938) 43.8 (6019) 60.2 (15354) 42.2 (14382) 45.2 (4993) 52686 
Alitalia   75.2 (11308) 68.1 (10138) 91.3 (29633) 74.6 (42798) 82.2 (14129) 108006 
BMI BritiMidland   54.3 (64187) 51.7 (49858) 57.4 (147038) 55.5 (143308) 58.7 (48109) 452500 
British Airways   70.8 (136088) 69.3 (89712) 76.5 (286210) 77.7 (333628) 79.2 (110520) 956158 
Czech Airlines   86.8 (1701) 71.6 (1687) 78.5 (8343) 73.5 (15318) 82.0 (5084) 32133 
Iberia   91.3 (15976) 77.1 (11892) 101.9 (36503) 67.8 (47611) 72.7 (15855) 127837 
KLM   70.8 (14553) 73.3 (8782) 82.3 (22030) 85.2 (21189) 64.0 (7031) 73585 
Lufthansa   62.5 (19426) 66.5 (12551) 72.9 (47498) 57.7 (39913) 59.7 (13256) 132644 
Scandin. Airlines   69.0 (12982) 82.8 (10262) 72.7 (30943) 69.8 (40141) 66.7 (13569) 107897 
Swiss   70.3 (18476) 85.1 (10704) 83.2 (39190) 79.1 (47690) 83.9 (15600) 131660 
Tot.Obs. 355040 762300 1856325 1166445 2697161 1955017 1436448 10228736
Source: our calculations based on the Internet retrieved fares. (Number of observations used to calculate the average is in parentheses). 
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Table 2 - Percentage fare changes by days of query prior to departure, season and geographical 
location 
 Jun03-Oct03 Nov03-Mar04 Apr04-Oct04 Nov04-Mar05 Apr05-Jun05 
Days  No  
Eland 
Eland No 
 Eland 
Eland No 
 
Eland 
Eland No 
 
Eland 
Eland No  
Eland 
Eland 
 % Δ Mean Monthly price 
1-4 10.2 1.1 2.2 -0.3 -3.2 2.4 7.1 5.8 8.4 -5.6
7-10  -17.0 -31.6 -12.5 -22.7 1.8 5.9 6.0 11.1 5.0 -7.1
14-21 -32.3 -40.7 -26.1 -36.5 0.0 0.5 8.5 9.6 3.8 -8.1
28-35 -27.2 -30.5 -27.8 -33.2 -3.4 -5.9 6.5 6.5 -2.5 -8.1
42-49  -29.6 -23.5 -23.9 -28.4 -5.3 -10.2 3.5 0.3 0.4 -4.9
56-70  -22.9 -17.6 -38.6 -31.1 -16.6 -19.8 -2.1 -8.5 5.1 -10.1
 % Δ Median Monthly price 
1-4 10.1 1.6 0.7 -0.6 -2.8 3.6 4.2 2.1 5.8 -9.4
7-10  -20.8 -41.4 -17.2 -35.3 1.5 7.0 -1.3 7.9 1.7 -8.4
14-21 -40.6 -51.5 -35.6 -56.0 -1.4 1.0 8.5 6.7 -1.3 -11.1
28-35 -38.0 -37.6 -40.6 -51.8 -4.8 -7.0 12.0 8.9 -5.2 -10.9
42-49  -36.3 -26.7 -33.3 -39.6 -8.3 -11.0 7.1 -1.7 0.5 -9.0
56-70  -25.3 -21.1 -49.5 -40.7 -20.6 -21.9 -1.4 -21.8 5.5 -11.3
 % Δ Minimum Monthly price 
1-4 25.5 4.1 2.9 9.0 3.3 15.8 12.9 18.6 11.8 -2.1
7-10  -35.5 -79.9 -71.7 -125.5 16.2 30.9 12.2 25.2 3.6 2.8
14-21 -72.5 -100.4 -85.1 -101.5 -8.8 -8.6 16.7 8.9 -2.0 -1.0
28-35 -57.6 -78.4 -109.4 -137.1 -13.6 -20.7 29.5 31.0 -5.5 -8.4
42-49  -44.7 -66.2 -97.9 -94.4 -20.3 -23.2 16.6 2.3 14.3 1.0
56-70  -25.7 -51.7 -88.3 -86.5 -33.7 -49.7 30.3 -6.5 40.3 19.7
Source: our elaboration on the Internet-retrieved fares’ dataset. 
 
Table 3 - Samples composition by period and number of companies per route 
 Route with one airline (%) Route with two airlines (%) Route with 3 or more airlines (%)
Samples CAA  Internet  Estimation CAA  Internet  Estimation CAA  Internet Estimation 
Jun 03 438 (78.5) 131 (69.7) 58 (87.9) 99 (17.7) 45 (23.9) 7 (10.6) 21 (3.8) 12 (6.4) 1 (1.5)
Jul 03 443 (79.4) 132 (70.2) 65 (86.7) 96 (17.2) 44 (23.4) 8 (10.7) 19 (3.4) 12 (6.4) 2 (2.7)
Aug 03 432 (77.8) 153 (70.8) 64 (84.2) 107 (19.3) 51 (23.6) 10 (13.2) 16 (2.9) 12 (5.6) 2 (2.6)
Sept 03 441 (78.8) 164 (74.2) 82 (82.8) 103 (18.4) 48 (21.7) 14 (14.1) 16 (2.9) 9 (4.1) 3 (3.0)
Oct 03 446 (77.3) 162 (72.0) 81 (82.7) 112 (19.4) 49 (21.8) 14 (14.3) 19 (3.3) 14 (6.2) 3 (3.1)
Nov 03 434 (78.3) 160 (72.4) 82 (82.8) 101 (18.2) 46 (20.8) 14 (14.1) 19 (3.4) 15 (6.8) 3 (3.0)
Dec 03 447 (78.3) 163 (70.9) 80 (80.8) 105 (18.4) 53 (23.0) 16 (16.2) 19 (3.3) 14 (6.1) 3 (3.0)
Jan 04 453 (78.2) 162 (71.7) 86 (76.8) 107 (18.5) 52 (23.0) 21 (18.8) 19 (3.3) 12 (5.3) 5 (4.5)
Feb 04 446 (78.2) 163 (70.3) 88 (75.9) 105 (18.4) 55 (23.7) 23 (19.8) 19 (3.3) 14 (6.0) 5 (4.3)
Mar 04 461 (78.1) 165 (70.8) 90 (76.3) 105 (17.8) 52 (22.3) 22 (18.6) 24 (4.1) 16 (6.9) 6 (5.1)
Apr 04 485 (78.2) 169 (71.9) 95 (68.8) 110 (17.7) 51 (21.7) 32 (23.2) 25 (4.0) 15 (6.4) 11 (8.0)
May 04 498 (78.8) 164 (72.6) 113 (66.9) 111 (17.6) 49 (21.7) 44 (26.0) 23 (3.6) 13 (5.8) 12 (7.1)
Jun 04 504 (78.9) 164 (71.0) 111 (66.9) 106 (16.6) 50 (21.6) 40 (24.1) 29 (4.5) 17 (7.4) 15 (9.0)
Jul 04 518 (79.1) 163 (72.1) 112 (67.9) 109 (16.6) 47 (20.8) 40 (24.2) 28 (4.3) 16 (7.1) 13 (7.9)
Aug 04 515 (79.0) 166 (71.9) 137 (70.6) 111 (17.0) 49 (21.2) 43 (22.2) 26 (4.0) 16 (6.9) 14 (7.2)
Sept 04 528 (79.3) 188 (74.3) 145 (71.4) 112 (16.8) 48 (19.0) 44 (21.7) 26 (3.9) 17 (6.7) 14 (6.9)
Oct 04 532 (80.0) 194 (74.0) 146 (71.9) 109 (16.4) 52 (19.8) 46 (22.7) 24 (3.6) 16 (6.1) 11 (5.4)
Nov 04 510 (79.6) 192 (74.1) 146 (73.0) 111 (17.3) 51 (19.7) 43 (21.5) 20 (3.1) 16 (6.2) 11 (5.5)
Dec 04 510 (79.3) 192 (75.3) 145 (71.1) 112 (17.4) 52 (20.4) 48 (23.5) 21 (3.3) 11 (4.3) 11 (5.4)
Jan 05 524 (78.8) 195 (71.2) 142 (71.7) 121 (18.2) 67 (24.5) 46 (23.2) 20 (3.0) 12 (4.4) 10 (5.1)
Feb 05 528 (78.6) 194 (71.3) 142 (69.3) 120 (17.9) 64 (23.5) 51 (24.9) 24 (3.6) 14 (5.1) 12 (5.9)
Mar 05 554 (77.5) 193 (70.2) 140 (68.3) 131 (18.3) 64 (23.3) 48 (23.4) 30 (4.2) 18 (6.5) 17 (8.3)
Apr 05 584 (78.9) 203 (71.5) 144 (68.9) 131 (17.7) 63 (22.2) 50 (23.9) 25 (3.4) 18 (6.3) 15 (7.2)
May 05 591 (78.2) 208 (72.0) 145 (69.0) 138 (18.3) 62 (21.5) 48 (22.9) 27 (3.6) 19 (6.6) 17 (8.1)
Jun 05 601 (77.6) 200 (70.7) 137 (66.8) 145 (18.7) 63 (22.3) 49 (23.9) 28 (3.6) 20 (7.1) 19 (9.3)
Source: our calculations based on United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority data (CAA), on Internet-retrieved fares Data (Internet) and the resulting Estimation sample. 
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Table 4- Descriptive statistics of regressors by season. 
 Jun03-Oct03 
N=2095 
Nov03-Mar04 
N=2837 
Apr04-Oct04 
N=8429 
Nov04-Mar05 
N=6206 
Apr05-Jun05 
N=4231 
 Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
% Δ Exchange rate -8.76 0.03 -5.00 0.04 3.77 0.02 -0.50 0.02 -2.35 0.02
% ΔExchg*D_Eland -7.95 0.04 -4.78 0.04 3.15 0.02 -0.17 0.01 -1.81 0.01
% Δ Fuel Cost  -8.16 0.06 -10.0 0.13 38.8 0.12 35.1 0.09 36.2 0.08
Inflation rate 0.023 0.73 0.021 0.61 0.023 0.71 0.022 0.72 0.022 0.73
Inflation * D_Eland 0.020 1.13 0.018 0.98 0.019 1.21 0.018 1.25 0.017 1.21
Citypair Size 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.15
N departures for 
arrival 
2.81 2.53 4.03 3.73 4.51 4.14 4.29 3.99 4.59 4.32
N routes airline in 
market 
1.76 1.03 1.65 0.92 1.76 1.01 1.78 1.03 1.86 1.10
D_ Own Entry in 
route 
0.00 0.00 0.004 0.06 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00
Route HHI 0.92 0.18 0.89 0.20 0.80 0.25 0.80 0.25 0.79 0.25
D_Departure is a 
hub 
0.83 0.37 0.64 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.62 0.49
Source: Datastream for Inflation and Exchange rate data; U.S. Department of Energy for Jet-Fuel data (excel file: 
PSW14VDJT.xls); UK Civil Aviation Authority for the remainder variables. D_ denote a Dummy variable. 
Exchange rates are measured in term of currency per UK sterling: a negative value reflects a devaluation of the 
latter.  
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Table 5 - Panel Estimates with groups defined by company, route and days from departure. Model 1. 
Dependent Variable: % Δ Mean Monthly price. t-statistics in round brackets 
 
HT RE IV: 
Full Sample 
2 stage FE: 
Full Sample 
HT RE IV: 
LCC Sample
2 stage FE: 
LCC Sample 
D_Season4: Nov03-Mar04 -0.03 (1.23) -0.03 (1.56) -0.03 (1.18) -0.03 (1.18) 
D_Season5: Apr04-Oct04 0.06 (2.26)b 0.06 (2.25)b -0.03 (0.98) -0.03 (0.98) 
D_Season6: Nov04-Mar05 0.21 (7.34)a 0.20 (6.70)a 0.23 (7.43)a 0.22 (7.43)a 
D_Season7: Apr05-Jun05 0.49 (15.5)a 0.47 (15.5)a 0.58 (16.6)a 0.56 (16.6)a 
% Δ Exchng rate Seas3/4 -0.66 (3.07)a -0.75 (3.42)a -0.63 (2.83)a -0.72 (2.83)a 
% Δ Exchng rate Seas5/6/7 0.11 (0.78) 0.08 (0.64) -0.15 (0.90) -0.23 (0.90) 
% Δ Fuel Cost† 0.44 (3.93)a 0.46 (3.74)a 0.44 (3.83)a 0.46 (3.83)a 
Distance 10^3ml -0.05 (1.18) -0.06 (0.94) -0.03 (0.67) -0.07 (0.67) 
Inflation rate 4.55 (4.24)a 4.75 (4.72)a 4.53 (3.83)a 4.97 (3.83)a 
Inflation * D_Eurozone -8.10 (6.30)a -8.34 (6.43)a -8.59(6.11)a -8.80 (6.11)a 
N departures airline to arrival -0.00 (1.54) -0.00 (0.64) -0.01 (3.33)a -0.02 (3.33)a 
N routes of airline in citypair -0.04 (6.82)a -0.07 (8.14)a -0.04 (5.48)a -0.07 (5.48)a 
D_ Own Entry in route 0.11 (4.56)a 0.11 (3.31)a 0.16 (5.81)a 0.16 (5.81)a 
D_Buzz 1 yr post takeover -0.07 (2.81)a -0.05 (1.20) -0.07 (2.63)b -0.05 (2.63) 
D_Buzz 2 yrs post takeover  0.10 (4.04)a 0.12 (3.18)a 0.10 (3.83)a 0.11 (3.83)a 
D_Gofly 1 yr post takeover -0.16 (10.5)a -0.15 (9.96)a -0.16 (10.3)a -0.16 (10.3)a 
D_Gofly 2 yrs post takeover  -0.01 (0.91) -0.01 (0.49) -0.01 (0.97) -0.01 (0.97) 
Citypair Size 1.30 (11.6)a 1.54 (10.7)a 1.18 (10.2)a 1.47 (10.2)a 
Route Herfindhal Index 0.14 (3.90)a 0.17 (4.50)a 0.14 (3.44)a 0.17 (3.44)a 
D_Season4 * D_Eurozone -0.02 (0.81) -0.01 (0.33) -0.02 (0.91) -0.01 (0.91) 
D_Season5 * D_Eurozone 0.05 (2.22)b 0.08 (3.36)a 0.09 (3.53)a 0.12 (3.53)a 
D_Season6 * D_Eurozone 0.07 (2.93)a 0.10 (3.72)a 0.05 (1.77)c 0.08 (1.77)c 
D_Season7 * D_Eurozone -0.01 (0.57) 0.01 (0.57) -0.05 (2.02)b -0.01 (2.02) 
D_Italy‡ 0.04 (0.98) -0.01 (0.28) 0.08 (1.59) 0.00 (1.59) 
D_France‡ 0.07 (1.70) 0.01 (0.31) 0.10 (2.34)b 0.04 (2.34)b 
D_Spain‡ 0.13 (2.78)b 0.11 (2.25)b 0.16 (2.95)a 0.17 (2.95)a 
D_Holland‡ -0.05 (0.92) -0.11 (2.17)b -0.02 (0.28) -0.10 (0.28) 
D_Germany‡ -0.08 (1.79)c -0.15 (2.97)a 0.00 (0.06) -0.04 (0.06) 
D_Belgium‡ 0.02 (0.56) -0.05 (1.08) 0.03 (0.63) -0.10 (0.63) 
D_Greece‡ -0.43 (6.63)a -0.56 (5.08)a -0.43 (5.65)a -0.56 (5.65)a 
D_Ireland‡ -0.97 (7.18)a -1.24 (14.4)a -0.83 (5.51)a -1.19 (5.51)a 
D_Portugal‡ 0.04 (0.84) 0.00 (0.06) 0.12 (2.51)b 0.20 (2.51)b 
D_Switzerland‡ -0.03 (0.48) -0.07 (0.76) 0.01 (0.10) -0.02 (0.10) 
D_Sweden‡ -0.25 (7.08)a -0.31 (7.15)a -0.21 (5.05)a -0.30 (5.05)a 
D_Norway‡ -0.37 (7.95)a -0.46 (4.06)a -0.31 (5.94)a -0.39 (5.94)a 
D_Austria‡ -0.43 (8.02)a -0.51 (5.43)a -0.35 (5.26)a -0.42 (5.26)a 
D_Czech Republic‡ -0.27 (6.72)a -0.32 (5.18)a -0.25 (5.72)a -0.30 (5.72)a 
D_7-10 days prior departure‡ -0.05 (3.30)a -0.05 (3.53)a -0.02 (1.21) -0.01 (1.21) 
D_14-21 days prior depart. ‡ -0.09 (5.18)a -0.06 (4.69)a -0.08 (4.36)a -0.06 (4.36)a 
D_28-35 days prior depart. ‡ -0.10 (6.15)a -0.08 (5.89)a -0.12 (6.19)a -0.10 (6.19)a 
D_42-49 days prior depart. ‡ -0.12 (6.96)a -0.10 (6.72)a -0.14 (7.19)a -0.12 (7.19)a 
D_56-70 days prior depart. ‡ -0.17 (9.30)a -0.14 (9.10)a -0.16 (8.71)a -0.14 (8.71)a 
D_Departure is a hub‡ -0.14 (5.08)a -0.11 (4.22)a -0.17 (5.81)a -0.15 (5.81)a 
Dummy Airlines included? ‡ Yes, both for LCC and FSC Yes, only LCC 
N 23798 23781 18931 18924 
N second stage  1742  1243 
R2 first stage  0.102  0.125 
R2 second stage  0.637  0.611 
Note: a,b,cdenotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. D_ identifies a Dummy variable. Models 
include a constant. Standard Errors in the FE models are robust to heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation. HT RE 
IV is the instrumental variable estimator proposed in Hausman and Taylor (1981). ‡ Based on Oaxaca and Geisler 
(2003) and Polachek and Kim (1994), the estimates from these time invariant dummies in the FE models are 
obtained from a second stage OLS estimation with White standard errors clustered over routes. † The coefficients 
from the interation of this variable with the seasonal dummies not reported to save on space.  
 
Table 6- Panel Estimates with groups defined by company and route. Model 2. 
 Dependent Variable: % Δ Mean Monthly price. 
 HT RE IV: 
Full Sample 
2 stage FE: 
Full Sample 
HT RE IV: 
LCC Sample
2 stage FE: 
LCC Sample 
D_Season4: Nov03-Mar04 0.14 (3.40)a 0.14 (3.52)a 0.14 (3.47)a 0.14 (3.56)a 
D_Season5: Apr04-Oct04 0.11 (2.46)b 0.11 (2.66)b 0.05 (1.04) 0.05 (1.05) 
D_Season6: Nov04-Mar05 0.09 (1.86)c 0.10 (2.00)b 0.12 (2.24)b 0.12 (2.25)b 
D_Season7: Apr05-Jun05 0.58 (10.1)a 0.58 (10.3)a 0.69 (11.3)a 0.69 (11.1)a 
% Δ Exchng rate Seas3/4 -0.85 (2.18)b -0.87 (2.39)b -0.86 (2.21)b -0.87 (2.38)b 
% Δ Exchng rate Seas5/6/7 0.51 (1.98)b 0.53 (2.21)b 0.32 (1.08) 0.30 (1.14) 
% Δ Fuel Cost† 0.39 (1.97)b 0.39 (2.00)b 0.38 (1.96)b 0.39 (1.99)b 
Distance 10^3ml -0.04 (0.50) -0.06 (0.82) 0.04 (0.37) 0.01 (0.13) 
Inflation rate 4.66 (2.44)b 4.61 (2.36)b 4.09 (2.03)b 4.13 (1.95)c 
Inflation * D_Eurozone -4.09 (1.79)c -4.06 (1.73)c -3.98 (1.66) -3.94 (1.58) 
N departures airline to arrival -0.00 (0.72) -0.00 (0.16) -0.00 (0.84) -0.01 (1.17) 
N routes of airline in citypair -0.04 (3.14)a -0.07 (4.67)a -0.05 (4.01)a -0.08 (5.26)a 
D_ Own Entry in route 0.03 (0.73) 0.03 (0.52) 0.09 (1.78)c 0.09 (1.38) 
D_Buzz 1 yr post takeover 0.05 (1.05) 0.08 (1.29) 0.06 (1.18) 0.08 (1.26) 
D_Buzz 2 yrs post takeover  0.09 (1.86)c 0.13 (2.12) 0.09 (2.01)b 0.13 (2.09)b 
D_Gofly 1 yr post takeover -0.15 (5.69)a -0.15 (6.03)a -0.15 (5.72)a -0.15 (6.06)a 
D_Gofly 2 yrs post takeover  -0.01 (0.28) -0.00 (0.08) -0.01 (0.21) 0.00 (0.05) 
Citypair Size 1.21 (5.86)a 1.33 (4.98)a 1.34 (6.22)a 1.49 (4.78)a 
Route Herfindhal Index 0.17 (2.63)b 0.15 (2.48)a 0.16 (2.22)b 0.14 (2.16)b 
D_Season4 * D_Eurozone -0.07 (1.60) -0.06 (1.39) -0.07 (1.63) -0.05 (1.37) 
D_Season5 * D_Eurozone 0.07 (1.57) 0.08 (1.93)c 0.10 (2.38)b 0.12 (2.89)a 
D_Season6 * D_Eurozone 0.04 (0.86) 0.04 (0.96) -0.00 (0.10) 0.01 (0.16) 
D_Season7 * D_Eurozone -0.06 (1.29) -0.05 (1.17) -0.08 (1.74)c -0.07 (1.38) 
D_Italy‡ 0.03 (0.36) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00) -0.03 (0.45) 
D_France‡ 0.08 (1.04) 0.05 (1.16) 0.07 (0.81) 0.04 (0.83) 
D_Spain‡ 0.09 (0.95) 0.08 (1.32) 0.06 (0.57) 0.07 (0.97) 
D_Holland‡ -0.01 (0.07) -0.05 (1.20) 0.00 (0.04) -0.02 (0.37) 
D_Germany‡ 0.03 (0.30) -0.03 (0.51) -0.00 (0.05) -0.07 (0.95) 
D_Belgium‡ -0.37 (2.81)a -0.42 (4.73)a -0.47 (3.08)a -0.52 (5.29)a 
D_Greece‡ -0.91 (3.46) -1.03 (9.76)a -1.08 (3.67)a -1.22 (11.6)a 
D_Ireland‡ 0.04 (0.48) 0.01 (0.11) 0.08 (0.91) 0.11 (1.81)c 
D_Portugal‡ -0.01 (0.08) -0.02 (0.25) -0.07 (0.51) -0.08 (0.80) 
D_Switzerland‡ -0.16 (2.18)b -0.20 (3.50)a -0.18 (2.03)b -0.23 (3.46)a 
D_Sweden‡ -0.30 (3.11)a -0.34 (3.16)a -0.32 (2.98)a -0.34 (2.82)a 
D_Norway‡ -0.36 (3.15)a -0.41 (3.49)a -0.32 (2.28)b -0.33 (2.30)b 
D_Austria‡ -0.01 (0.05) -0.04 (0.67) -0.04 (0.28) -0.06 (0.97) 
D_Czech Republic‡ -0.14 (1.65) -0.17 (2.84)a -0.20 (2.19)b -0.22 (3.35)a 
D_Departure is a hub‡ -0.13 (2.29)b -0.10 (3.81)a -0.12 (2.05)b -0.12 (4.23)a 
Dummy Airlines included?‡ Yes, both for LCC and FSC Yes, only LCC 
N 4384 4382 3554 3553 
N second stage  275  210 
R2 first stage  0.13  0.169 
R2 second stage  0.622  0.633 
Note: a,b,cdenotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. D_ identifies a Dummy variable. Models 
include a constant. Standard Errors in the FE models are robust to heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation. HT RE 
IV is the instrumental variable estimator proposed in Hausman and Taylor (1981). ‡ Based on Oaxaca and Geisler 
(2003) and Polachek and Kim (1994), the estimates from these time invariant dummies in the FE models are 
obtained from a second stage OLS estimation with White standard errors clustered over routes. † The coefficients 
from the interation of this variable with the seasonal dummies not reported to save on space.  
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Figure 3 - % difference of fare posted by target firms relative to fares posted by acquiring firms after the 
takeovers, on routes previously served by the target firms. Fares are distinguished by number of days to 
departures. 
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Source: our calculations on the Internet-retrieved dataset of fares. 
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